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The Stock Market and Audit Market Effects of a Big 4 Security Breach 
 
ABSTRACT:  This research provides insights into how audit clients and investors respond to a 
breach of confidential client data by an audit firm.  Specifically, on September 25, 2017, Deloitte 
& Touche (a.k.a., Deloitte), an international Big 4 audit firm, reported that its systems had 
sustained a six month long cyber-attack lasting from October 2016 to March 2017 (Hopkins 2017).  
We examine whether Deloitte’s reputation was impacted.  We find that Deloitte’s audit clients at 
the time of the breach did not experience a change in audit fees, nor were they more likely to 
dismiss Deloitte.  However, Deloitte experienced a decrease in the number of new audit clients 
after the breach announcement as well as decreased first year audit fees for new clients.  A negative 
market reaction was only found for clients that dismissed Deloitte.  Thus, Deloitte’s reputation 
appears to be only tarnished for companies searching for a new auditor. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This research provides insights into how audit clients and investors responded to a breach 
of confidential client data by an audit firm.  Specifically, on September 25, 2017, Deloitte & 
Touche (a.k.a., Deloitte), an international Big 4 audit firm, reported that its systems had sustained 
a six month long cyber-attack lasting from October 2016 to March 2017 (Hopkins 2017).  The 
hacker compromised Deloitte’s global email system through a weakly setup administrator’s 
account that gave the hacker unlimited access to all areas of the company’s audit, tax, and 
consulting practices.  While Deloitte knew about the breach in March 2017, it did not publicly 
announce it until September 25, 2017.  To determine if the reputation of Deloitte was impacted, 
we examine the audit market and stock market effects associated with this breach announcement. 
Big 4 audit firms have a reputation for providing high quality audits, which allows them to 
charge higher audit fees as well as to attract and retain clients (Krishnamurthy, Zhou, and Zhou 
2006; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang 2008).  A Big 4 audit failure 
(e.g., missed fraud) at one client creates uncertainty about the quality of all of its audits as well as 
the accuracy of its clients’ financial statements (Krishnamurthy, Zhou, and Zhou 2006).  This 
uncertainty leads to loss of audit clients as well as a negative information transfer to other clients 
of the “failing” Big 4 audit firm (i.e., negative abnormal stock market returns) (Gao, Jamul, Lio, 
and Luo 2011; Saito and Takeda 2014; Weber et al. 2008).1   
While the impact of an audit failure on Big 4 auditor reputation has been studied, the impact 
of a Big 4 security breach on Big 4 auditor reputation has not been studied.  Instead, most extant 
research on security breaches focuses on the stock market impact to the breached company, 
                                                          
1 An information transfer is when information about one company affects the market prices for other companies (Foster 
1986).   
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generally finding (very small) negative abnormal market returns.2  Other studies find information 
transfers after the breach announcement to competitors as well as security vendors and insurance 
carriers (e.g., Ettredge and Richardson 2003; Garg, Curtis, and Halper 2003; Hinz, Nofer, 
Schiereck, and Trillig 2015).   
We expect a Big 4 security breach to have an impact on Big 4 auditor reputation for several 
reasons.  First, a security breach is a type of operational control risk (i.e., the probability of a 
weakness in internal control over operations), which provides information about the companies’ 
overall control environment (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Vyas 2018).  Therefore, a security 
breach may reflect a lack of commitment by management to support a strong internal control 
environment (Lawrence et al. 2018), which provides the basis for carrying out internal control 
across the organization (COSO 2017).  So, a lack of attention to controls in cybersecurity (i.e., a 
weakly setup administrator’s account) may indicate a lack of attention to controls and procedures 
over the auditing process.   
Second, unlike companies, a professional accountant is to act in the interest of the public.  
As part of that responsibility, an accountant must protect the confidentiality of client data and not 
disclose it to a third party (IFAC 2006).  Unfortunately, “many CPA firms do not realize that they 
are at risk and/or do not have anything in place to protect themselves” (Anonymous 2017), 
indicating that the Deloitte breach may be just the tip of the iceberg for audit firm breaches of 
client data.  The Deloitte breach highlighted this lack of cyber security investment by audit firms, 
which may negatively affect auditor reputation in this interconnected world. 
                                                          
2 Several studies provide an overview of the extant literature in this area (e.g., Table 1 in Tanimura and Wehrly 2015; 
Spanos and Angelis 2016; Richardson, Watson, and Smith 2018).  In addition, more recent studies report no real 
impact on stock market prices, future performance, audit and other fees, Sarbanes-Oxley material weakness reporting, 
and analyst forecasts (e.g., Hilary, Segal, and Zhang 2016; Richardson et al. 2018). 
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Given the growing threat of breaches to audit firms, our research should be of interest to 
variety of constituents, including audit firms, regulators, and audit committees.  Specifically, audit 
firms need to understand the consequences of not protecting their clients’ data.  Our research may 
provide them with extra incentive to invest and secure internal systems.  With respect to regulators, 
our results should provide valuable input for the PCAOB and SEC, both of which have recently 
prioritizing cyber security as major initiatives (Hammer and Zuckerman 2018; PCAOB 2017).  
With respect to audit committees, as part of the audit firm hiring/firing/retention process, audit 
committees’ may want to procure written assurances about the quality and security of the audit 
firm’s internal systems to ensure that their companies’ data remains secure and confidential.   
To determine the reputational impact of the breach of Deloitte’s systems, we examine the 
audit market and stock market effects for Deloitte.  With respect to the audit market effects, we 
examine Deloitte dismissals, engagements, and the change in audit fees a year after the breach 
announcement.  If audit clients are worried about audit quality after the breach, they will dismiss 
Deloitte as their auditor.  However, as the complexity and size of an audit client increases, the cost 
of switching auditors also increases because the new auditor does not possess audit client specific 
knowledge and cannot have the same audit efficiencies (initially) as the incumbent auditor (Hennes 
et al. 2014).  So, audit clients may not dismiss Deloitte as their auditor after the breach if they 
judge the switching costs too high.  Moreover, in order to retain existing audit clients or attract 
new clients, Deloitte may have to reduce its audit fees (compared to prior years) after the breach. 
With respect to the stock market effect, if investors believe the lax security controls at 
Deloitte indicate a lack of attention to detail lower quality audit, then the abnormal returns should 
be negative.  However, if security breaches are not viewed as an indicator of lower audit quality, 
then stock prices should not be affected.   
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 Our results reveal audit market as well as stock market effects following the security 
breach.  Specifically, while we do not find an impact on the dismissal rate and audit fees for 
Deloitte’s existing clients, we do document a decrease in new client engagements and lower first 
year audit fees for new clients following the breach.  We also do not find a market reaction to the 
breach announcement for Deloitte clients.  But, we do find a negative market reaction for clients 
that dismissed Deloitte following the breach.  Altogether the results indicate that Deloitte’s 
existing clients and the market did not think the breach negatively affected Deloitte’s reputation.  
However, the new client audit market shows that Deloitte’s reputation was harmed.   
We organize the remainder of the study as follows.  First, we review the data breach and 
audit reputation literature and develop our hypotheses.  Second, we describe our samples and 
research design.  Finally, we discuss the results and provide concluding comments. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
In 2021, the estimated annual cost of cyber crime will be $6 trillion, twice as much as it 
cost in 2015, and the “greatest transfer of economic wealth in history” (Morgan 2018).  Well-
established business leaders like Ginni Rommetty (IBM’c CEO, chairman and president) and 
Warren Buffett (CEO of Berkshire Hathaway) stated that cyber crimes/attacks are “the greatest 
threat to every company in the world” and the “number one problem with mankind” (Morgan 
2018, Oyedele 2017), respectively.  So, all companies need to prepare for, and attempt to prevent, 
cyber attacks, which may lead to a data breach.  A data breach is an “incident in which sensitive, 
protected or confidential data has potentially been viewed, stolen or used by an individual 
unauthorized to do so…[it] may involve personal health information (PHI), personally identifiable 
information (PII), trade secrets or intellectual property” (Lord 2018).  
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Not only is the number and magnitude of data breaches increasing, but the financial impact 
to companies is also increasing (Folynton 2017).  A 2016 survey by Ponemon Institute estimates 
the cost of a data breach to a company as $7 million dollars (Puzas 2016).  The potential costs 
include: remediation expenses to identify and stop the breach; regulatory fines; loss of revenues 
due to business disruption(s); legal expenses; direct financial loss from bank account drainages; 
and costs of notifying, assisting, and providing ID monitoring to affected parties (Puzas 2016).  
There are also the harder-to-quantify expenses such as diminished goodwill and reputation leading 
to customer loss (Puzas 2016).  In fact, a 2016 survey of 2,000 U.S. consumers finds that 76 percent 
would “move away” from companies with a high record of data breaches (Dark Reading Staff 
2016).   
Using this setting as a backdrop, we examine the audit market and stock market effects 
associated with the announcement of a Big 4 auditor breach of confidential client information.  
Specifically, on September 25, 2017, Deloitte & Touche (a.k.a., Deloitte), an international Big 4 
audit/accounting firm, reported that its systems had sustained a six month long cyber attack lasting 
from October 2016 and March 2017 (Hopkins 2017).  The hacker compromised Deloitte’s global 
email system through a weakly setup administrator’s account that gave the hacker unlimited access 
to all areas of the company’s audit, tax, and consulting practices.  While Deloitte knew about the 
breach in March 2017, it did not publicly announce it until September 25, 2017.   
Auditor Reputation 
Public trust of the accounting profession is important for efficient capital markets.  Big 4 
audit firms strive to provide high quality audits to establish a reputation that allows them to charge 
higher audit fees and attract/retain clients (Krishnamurthy, et al. 2006; Skinner and Srinivasan 
2012; Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang 2008).  However, when a Big 4 auditor reports an audit 
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failure (e.g., missed fraud), it creates uncertainty about the quality of all of its audits as well as the 
accuracy of its clients’ financial statements (Krishnamurthy, Zhou, and Zhou 2006).  This 
uncertainty translates into an information transfer, or a negative market reaction, for the clients of 
the “failing” Big 4 audit firm. 
For example, Weber et al. (2008) study the ComROAD fraud where the German company 
reported large amounts of fictitious revenue (63% to 97%), which went undetected for years by its 
auditor, KPMG.  They find that KPMG’s clients experience a negative 3% market reaction, 
especially for companies with higher demands for audit quality.  Similarly, Gao et al. (2011) 
document negative abnormal returns of 4.4% for Deloitte’s clients after its client Kelon 
Electronical Holdings Co Ltd was investigated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
for fictitious revenues, underestimating expenses, and misappropriation of funds.  This effect even 
includes affiliated audit groups as demonstrated by negative abnormal return for Pricewaterhouse 
(PwC)’s clients after its Japanese affiliate (ChuoAoyama) suffered an audit failure at Kanebo 
(Saitu and Takeda 2014). 
Breach Literature 
While the impact of an audit failure on Big 4 auditor reputation has been studied, the impact 
of a Big 4 security breach has not been studied.  Most extant research on security breaches focuses 
on the impact to the breached company.  Several studies provide a review of this literature, 
generally finding (very small) negative abnormal market returns for security breaches and other 
cyber attacks (Tanimura and Wehrly 2015; Spanos and Angelis 2016; Richardson et al. 2018).  
Some studies find negative reactions only to confidential information (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, 
and Zhou 2003; Aytes, Byers, and Santhanakrishnan 2006), which client audit data definitely 
would be classified as.  However, more recent studies using larger and longer samples than most 
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extant research generally do not find a significant stock market reaction (or any other impact) for 
any type of breach information except in catastrophic breaches (Hilary et al. 2016; Richardson et 
al. 2018). 
Auditor Reputation and Security Breaches 
We expect a Big 4 security breach to have an impact on Big 4 auditor reputation for several 
reasons.  First, a security breach is a type of operational control risk (i.e., the probability of a 
weakness in internal control over operations), which provides information about the companies’ 
overall control environment (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Vyas 2018).  Therefore, a security 
breach may reflect a lack of commitment by management to support a strong internal control 
environment (Lawrence et al. 2018), which provides the basis for carrying out internal control 
across the organization (COSO 2017).  This “tone at the top” attitude not only establishes the 
importance of internal controls, but “its attitude toward controls has pervasive effects on the actual 
control procedures throughout the organization also expected standards of conduct” (COSO 2017).  
So, a lack of attention to controls in cybersecurity (i.e., a weakly setup administrator’s account) 
may indicate a lack of attention to controls and procedures over the entire auditing process, eroding 
auditor reputation.   
Moreover, when a company loses control over its customer information, “it also suffers a 
loss of trust with its customers” (Pritchard 2018).  Accountants, however, just don’t serve 
customers.  Rather, they develop relationships with clients and serve as the protectors of the public 
interest.  As part of that responsibility, an accountant must protect the confidentiality of client data 
and not disclose it to a third party (IFAC 2006).  Moreover, audit firm data is “extremely attractive 
to hackers” (Anonymous 2017).  It contains non-public, strategic, financial, and operating data for 
their clients.  If payroll/employment data is included, there is also PII.  This information can be 
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used as insider information to generate profits in the stock market or manipulate the behavior of 
individuals.  Unfortunately, “many CPA firms do not realize that they are at risk and/or do not 
have anything in place to protect themselves” (Anonymous 2017), indicating that the Deloitte 
breach may be just the tip of the iceberg for audit firm breaches of client data.  A wrong step by 
one audit firm may negatively impact the entire profession because “[a]ccountants will lose their 
legitimacy as protectors of public interest if there is no public trust” (Jui and Wong 2013).  The 
Deloitte breach highlighted the lack of cyber security investment by audit firms, which may 
negatively affect auditor reputation in this interconnected world. 
Auditor Market Effects 
We first examine the audit market effects of a Big 4 security breach.  Audit market effects 
are usually evaluated by studying auditor dismissals and audit fees.   
Auditor Dismissals/Engagements 
If an audit client dismisses an auditor for any reason, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requires the company to file a Form 8-K Item 4.01 within four days of the 
dismissal.  Audit clients dismiss auditors for a variety of reasons including:  disagreements with 
the auditors, changes in operations, audit opinion shopping, or a desire to reduce audit fees (see 
Pacheco-Paredes et al. 2017 for a discussion).   
Prior literature examines how the uncertainty around audit failures affect client retention.  
This literature builds on DeAngelo’s (1981) work, that if a high-quality auditor is caught cheating 
by providing a low quality audit then it should be “punished” by its clients.  In other words, market 
forces penalize audit firms associated with low quality audits (Swanquist and Whited 2015).  Thus, 
if an audit firm is perceived to be executing lower quality audits, audit clients may dismiss the 
“failing” auditor (or potential clients may not engage the “failing” auditor).  For example, 
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Swanquist and Whited (2015) find that local audit offices have difficulty retaining and attracting 
clients after one of their existing audit clients has a restatement.  In addition, Weber et al. (2008) 
reports that KPMG’s attrition rate doubled after the ComROAD audit failure (15.7% versus 7.7%).  
Similarly, Gao et al. (2011) find that Deliotte not only lost audit clients to local (not Big 4) audit 
firms, but all Big 4 firms also lost market share in the IPO market.   
We build on this literature by examining whether (1) current audit clients dismissed 
Deloitte after the breach announcement and (2) Deloitte’s rate of new client engagements changed 
after the breach announcement.  If audit clients are worried about audit quality after the breach, 
they will dismiss Deloitte as their auditor.  However, as the complexity and size of an audit client 
increases, the cost of switching auditors also increases because the new auditor does not possess 
audit client specific knowledge and cannot have the same audit efficiencies (initially) as the 
incumbent auditor (Hennes et al. 2014).  So, audit clients may not dismiss Deloitte as their auditor 
after the breach if they judge the switching costs too high.  Given the competing arguments, do not 
make a prediction about client retention for Deloitte after the breach announcement.  We also 
examine whether the breach affected Deloitte’s ability to attract new clients.  If the breach affected 
Deloitte’s reputation, new clients would be less likely to engage Deloitte as their auditor following 
the breach.  Our first hypotheses are: 
H1A: The likelihood of audit clients of Deloitte dismissing the auditor increased after the 
breach announcement. 
 
H1B: The likelihood of new clients engaging Deloitte decreased after the breach 
announcement. 
 
Audit Fees 
Extant literature examines audit fees from the client firm perspective.  It generally supports 
the idea that auditors reduce the first couple years of audit fees (a.k.a., “low-balling”) to attract 
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new audit clients (Ettredge et al. 2007).  Big 4 auditors, on average, reduce initial audit fees by 
four percent (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2016).  Research also finds that Big 4 auditors risk-adjust their 
audit fees.  So, risky clients pay higher audit fees than less risky clients even in the initial 
engagement year (see Elliott et al 2013 for a discussion of the literature).  Risky clients, on average, 
pay 23 percent more for the initial audit engagement than less risky clients (Elliott et al. 2013).  
Thus, Big 4 firms charge risky firms more for audits. 
In the context of our topic, extant research finds that audit clients with cyber breaches are 
generally associated with higher audit fees due to increased client business risk and increased audit 
(control) risk (Higgs, Pinsker, and Smith 2018; Lawrence et al. 2018; Li, No, and Boritz 2017; 
Yen, Lim, Wang, and Han 2018).3  Once again, we flip the focus of the research and examine how 
the auditor’s risky behavior affects their audit fee revenues.  If Deloitte’s security breach 
negatively affected its (high) quality reputation, then Deloitte may have to reduce its audit fees to 
attract new clients and/or keep current clients.  Thus, total audit fee revenue for Deloitte clients 
may be reduced after the breach.  This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2:  Audit fee revenue for Deloitte is lower after the data breach. 
 
Stock Market Effects 
We next examine the stock market effects of the Deloitte.  Based on the auditor reputation 
and security breach literature, if investors believe the lax security at Deloitte, which facilitated a 
breach, indicates a lower quality audit, then the stock market should react negatively.  (If, however, 
security breaches are not viewed as an indicator of lower audit quality, then stock prices should 
not be affected.)  Thus, our last hypothesis is: 
H3:  Current audit clients of Deloitte experienced a negative stock market price reaction 
after the breach announcement. 
                                                          
3 Note, Richardson et al. (2018) do not find that audit fees increase after a breach. 
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III. DATA AND METHOD 
Sample 
Our sample consists of all clients of Big 4 audit firms with complete auditor-related data 
in Audit Analytics between 2004 and 2018.  We focus only on Big 4 auditors because Deloitte, 
the audit firm that experienced the data breach, is a Big 4 audit firm and as such is fundamentally 
different from non-Big 4 in terms of the reputation, audit fee structure, client composition, and 
litigation risk (Dopuch and Simunic 1980; DeAngelo 1981).  We merge the auditor related data 
from Audit Analytics with financial statement data from Compustat North America.  Our final 
sample is 35,499 firm-year observations.  
Model to Examine Auditor Changes and Audit Fees 
Our first test investigates whether the disclosure of the data breach is associated with the 
likelihood /of the engagement or dismissal of Deloitte, i.e., were audit clients more or less likely 
to dismiss or appoint Deloitte following the disclosure of the data breach?  Second, we examine 
whether the disclosure of the data breach subsequently affected audit fees paid by clients of 
Deloitte.  We use the following logistic regression model to examine the relation between the 
disclosure of the data breach by Deloitte and the likelihood of the engagement or dismissal of 
Deloitte. 
Dismissal =β0 + β1Post + β2Dismissal_Deloitte + β3(Post X Dismissal_Deloitte) + β4Ln(Assets) 
+ β5Ret_Std + β6Ocf_Std + β7Revt_Std + β8Zmijewski_Z + β9Roa + β10Leverage 
+ β11Btm + β12Revgrowth + β13Ocf + β14Ar_Invt + β15Icw + β16Restate + β17Gc 
+ β18Replag + β19BusyYrEnd + Industry Effects                                                 (1) 
 
Engagement =β0 + β1Post + β2Engagement_Deloitte + β3(Post X Engagement_Deloitte) + 
β4Ln(Assets) + β5Ret_Std + β6Ocf_Std + β7Revt_Std + β8Zmijewski_Z + β9Roa + 
β10Leverage + β11Btm + β12Revgrowth + β13Ocf + β14Ar_Invt + β15Icw + 
β16Restate + β17Gc + β18Replag + β19BusyYrEnd + Industry Effects                  (2) 
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The dependent variable in Equation 1, Dismissal, equals 1 if the client’s independent 
auditor changes from year t to year t+1, 0 otherwise.  In Equation 2, Engagement equals 1 if the 
client’s independent auditor in year changes from year t-1 to year t, 0 otherwise.  Therefore, we 
are examining whether a client dismisses or appoints a new auditor with the year t as the point of 
reference.  Dismissal_Deloitte is 1 if the dismissed auditor in year t is Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  
Engagement_Deloitte equals 1 if the appointed auditor in year t is Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  The 
independent variable, Post, equals 1 for the period after the announcement of the data breach, 0 
otherwise.  Our primary variables of interest are Post X Dismissal_Deloitte and Post X 
Engagement_Deloitte, the interaction between Post and Dismissal_Deloitte and between Post and 
Engagement_Deloitte.  The coefficient β3 in Equation 1 and Equation 2 indicates whether there is 
a significant difference in the likelihood of the dismissals or engagement of Deloitte pre- and post- 
the announcement of the data breach.  
We also use the following OLS regression model to examine whether there is any 
significant difference in the total audit fees paid by clients of Deloitte before and after the 
disclosure of the data breach using Equation 3. 
Ln(Audfees)=β0 + β1Post + β2Deloitte + β3(Post X Deloitte) + β4Ln(Assets) + β5Ret_Std + 
β6Ocf_Std + β7Revt_Std + β8Zmijewski_Z + β9Roa + β10Leverage + β11Btm + 
β12Revgrowth + β13Ocf + β14Ar_Invt + β15Icw + β16Restate + β17Gc + β18Replag 
+ β19BusyYrEnd + Industry Effects                                                                    (3) 
 
The dependent variable in Equation 3 is the natural logarithm of total audit fees paid by 
client to the auditor in year t.  The independent variable, Deloitte, equals 1 if the client’s 
independent auditor in year t is Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  The independent variable, Post, equals 1 for 
the period after the announcement of the data breach, 0 otherwise.  The significance of the 
interaction variable, Post X Deloitte, captures the effect of the data breach on the total audit fees 
(AudFees) paid to Deloitte.  
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We control for the same independent variables in Equations 1, 2, and 3.  Auditor-client 
realignment and audit fee pricing decisions are both influenced by the same factors, which capture 
the overall risks associated with the audit engagement (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Abbott, 
Parker, and Peters 2006; Schwartz and Soo 1996; Mande and Son 2012).  We include several 
control variables shown in prior research to be correlated with auditor change and audit fees 
(Nichols and Smith 1983; Schwartz and Menon 1985; Francis and Wilson 1988; Johnson and Lys 
1990; DeFond 1992; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2006; Schwartz and 
Soo 1996; Mande and Son 2012).  We control for client by including the total assets (Assets).  
Evidence from prior accounting research suggests complexity can be associated with auditor-client 
realignment and audit pricing decisions (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Sankaraguruswamy and 
Whisenant 2004).  As the client’s operational complexity increases (decreases), the number of 
agency relationships increases (decreases) making it difficult (easier) for external stakeholders to 
monitor managerial discretions.  
We control for the company’s financial condition by including variables that capture the 
profitability, leverage, and liquidity of the client.  Companies that are in good financial condition 
are considered by auditors to have low audit risk.  Hence, auditors will continue to seek a 
relationship with these clients or charge a higher audit fee premium to compensate for this risk. 
We control for the volatility of the stock returns (Ret_Std), volatility of cash flow from operations 
(Ocf_Std), and volatility of sales revenue (Revt_Std).  We control for probability of bankruptcy 
(Zmijewski_Z), profitability (Roa), level of cash flow from operations (OCF), financial leverage 
(Leverage), growth opportunity (Btm and Revgrowth), and the proportion of total assets in 
receivables and inventory (Ar_Invt).  
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Following prior research audit pricing and auditor changes (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 
2006; Ettredge, Scholz, and Li 2007; Huang, Raghunandan, and Rama 2009; Mande and Son 
2012), we control for the quality of the client’s financial reporting by including indicator variables 
for material weakness in internal control over financial reporting (Icw) and the disclosure of an 
accounting misstatement in previously issued financial statements (Restate).  We also include an 
indicator variable for modified going-concern opinion (Gc) following prior research on audit 
opinion shopping (Lu 2006; Krishnan and Stephens 1995).  Finally, we control for audit report lag 
(Replag) and busy year-end audits (BusyYrEnd).  
Model to Examine Market Reaction  
 In the second part of our analyses, we examine the market reaction to announcement of the 
data breach by Deloitte.  We use the market-adjusted return model with a value weighted index to 
estimate the abnormal return on the day of announcement of the data breach, September 25, 2017 
According to the market adjusted returns model, abnormal returns, are computed by subtracting 
the observed return on the market index for day t, Rmt, from the rate of return (Rit) of the common 
stock of the ith firm in the sample on day t as seen in Equation 4:  
AbRetit = Rij - Rmt                                                                   (4) 
 
We use CRSP’s value-weighted index as the benchmark index in estimating the abnormal 
returns of each firm in the sample on the event announcements dates.  To examine market reaction 
to the announcement of the data breach by Deloitte, we estimate the following OLS regression:  
AbRet =β0 + β1Deloitte + β3Ln(Mkvl) + β4Btm + β5Momentum + Industry Effect                     (5) 
To compare market reaction to the announcement of the dismissal or engagement of Deloitte pre- 
and post- the announcement of data breach, we estimate the following OLS regression:  
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AbRet =β0 + β1Post + β2Dismissal_Deloitte + β3(Post X Dismissal_Deloitte) + 
β4Engagement_Deloitte + β5(Post X Engagement_Deloitte) + β6Ln(Mkvl) + β7Btm + 
β8Momentum + Industry Effect                                                                                         (6) 
 
Following prior auditor-related event studies (e.g., Davidson, Xie, and Xu 2004; DeFond, 
Hann, and Hu 2005), we also control for firm size (Mkvl), measured as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity; book to market value (Btm), measured as book value per share scaled by 
market price per share; and the momentum (Momentum) of the firm’s share price in the period 
before the event announcement.  We make no predictions on the sign of the coefficients. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Table 1 reports the summary statistics of variables used to estimate client 
dismissals/engagements of Deloitte and total audit fees paid to Deloitte pre- and post- 
announcement of data breach.  Approximately, six percent of the firm-year observations are in the 
post data breach period.  Deloitte clients represent about 24 percent of observations in the sample.  
Approximately, 10 percent (0.0042/0.0414) and 28 percent (0.0081/0.0288) of the auditor 
dismissals and engagements observations over the period 2004 to 2018 involve the dismissal and 
engagement of Deloitte, respectively.  
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
Auditor Dismissals and Engagements Analyses 
We present the results of the logistic regression model examining the effect of the data 
breach on Deloitte’s dismissals and engagements in the first and second columns of Table 2, 
respectively.  Both logistic regressions are estimated with industry fixed effects to control for 
industry-specific factors potentially correlated with auditor-client realignment decisions.  The Chi-
sq. statistics are estimated based on clustered standard errors.  Both models are significant at the 1 
percent level.  In the first column of Table 2, the dependent variable, Dismissals equals 1 if the 
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client dismissed the external auditor in year t and appoints a new auditor in year t +1, 0 otherwise.  
The independent variable of interest, Post X Dismissals_Deloitte is the interaction of Post and 
Dismissals_Deloitte.  The variable Dismissals_Deloitte equals 1 if the departing auditor in year t 
is Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of Post X Dismissals_Deloitte is not significant 
suggesting that the announcement of the data breach did not affect the likelihood of a client 
dismissing Deloitte.  Many control variables load consistently with prior research.  For example, 
we find a significantly positive association between auditor dismissals and the following 
independent variables:  internal control issues, restatements, going-concerns, and longer report 
audit report lag.   
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
In the second column of Table 2, the dependent variable, Engagements equals 1 if the client 
dismissed an auditor in year t-1 and appoints a new external auditor in year t, 0 otherwise.  The 
independent variable of interest, Post X Engagements_Deloitte is the interaction of Post and 
Engagements_Deloitte.  The variable Engagements_Deloitte is 1 if the incoming auditor in year t 
is Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of Post X Engagement_Deloitte is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the announcement of the data breach is associated with a decrease in 
the likelihood of a client appointing Deloitte as its auditor in the post data breach period.  
Auditor Fee Analyses 
 We present the results of the OLS regression model that examine the effect of the data 
breach on audits fees paid by clients of Deloitte in Table 3.  The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of total audit fees paid by clients (AudFees).  The independent variable Deloitte is an 
indicator variable that takes the value 1 for Deloitte clients, 0 otherwise.  The independent variable 
of interest, Post X Deloitte, captures the significance of the audit fees earned by Deloitte in the 
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post data breach period.  In the first column of Table 3, we estimate the OLS model for the full 
sample.  However, because clients have a stronger bargaining power over the audit fees paid to the 
independent auditor when it comes to first year audits compared ongoing audit engagements 
(Simon and Francis 1988; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; and Deis and Giroux 1996), we separate 
the sample in to continuing audit engagements (column 2) and first year audit engagements 
(column 3).  
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
 In the first column of Table 3, the coefficient of Post X Deloitte is negative, but not 
significant, suggesting that the data breach did not affect the bargaining power of Deloitte with 
respect to the total audits fees associated with its audit engagements in the post data breach period.  
In the second column of Table 3 where we only consider the effect of data breach on continuing 
engagements, the coefficient of Post X Deloitte is also negative, but not also significant.  However, 
in the third column (first year audits), the coefficient of the interaction variable, Post X Deloitte is 
negative and significant, indicating that first year audit clients of Deloitte paid significantly lower 
total audit fees after the data breach disclosure. 
 In a related sensitivity analysis, we also examine the effect of the data breach on changes 
in audit fees as opposed total audit fees (in Table 3).  The total audit fees paid by a client is jointly 
determined with many other firm- and industry-related attributes, suggesting that a cross-sectional 
approach based on variable levels alone mixes the antecedents and consequences of changes in 
audit fees (Vafeas and Waegalein 2007).  To address this problem, we re-estimate an OLS 
regression model that examines the effect of the data breach on changes in total audit fees and 
controlling for changes in other potential determinants of changes in audit fees.  We present the 
results of this analysis in Table 4.  Similar to the Table 3 results, the coefficient of Post X Deloitte 
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is insignificant for All engagements (column 1) and continuing engagements (column 2), but 
significantly negative for first year audit engagements (column 3).  This result is consistent with 
the “levels” analysis and suggests that in the post data breach period, Deloitte’s new clients have 
a significant decrease in audit fees. 
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Market Reaction Analyses 
 In this section, we examine market reaction to the disclosure of the data breach by Deloitte.  
Examining the market reaction to the disclosure of the breach enables us to evaluate investors’ 
assessment of the economic impact of the breach from concerns regarding confidentiality, integrity 
and accessibility of audit client information that potentially could be exposed (and used) by bad 
actors.  Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the model to examine market 
reaction to the breach.  Just like our audit market analysis, we compare Deloitte to the other Big 4 
audit firms.  Specifically, we compare the total stock market reaction for Deloitte’s clients to the 
total stock market reaction for the clients of the other Big 4 accounting firms on the event date.  
The average abnormal return on the event announcement date is -0.22 percent.  
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
Table 6 presents the results of the OLS regression the examine market reaction to the 
disclosure of the data breach.  The dependent variable is the abnormal market returns estimated on 
the announcement date using market adjusted returns with a value weighted index (AbRet). The 
independent variable of interest, Deloitte is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for Deloitte 
clients, 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of Deloitte in the OLS regression is negative, but not 
significant.  Overall, we do not find any significant market reaction to the disclosure of the breach 
for Deloitte clients compared to clients of other Big 4 audit firms. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We also compare the market reaction to dismissal and engagement of Deloitte as auditor 
before and after the breach.  We use the market-adjusted return model with a value weighted index 
to estimate the abnormal return on: (1) the dates of announcement of dismissal of Deloitte and 
other Big 4 audit firms between 2004 and 2018, and (2) on the dates of announcement of 
engagement of Deloitte and other Big 4 audit between 2004 and 2018.Table 7 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the OLS regression model to examine market reaction to the announcement 
of the dismissal or appointment of Deloitte as independent auditor pre- and post- the disclosure.  
Clients’ dismissal of Deloitte following the disclosure of the breach may be motivated by the type 
of confidential client information compromised by the breach.  The potential leakage of sensitive 
client information obtained during an audit may lead to costly litigation for the client and loss of 
competitive edge.  Hence, such concerns can cause investors to react negatively dismissal of the 
Deloitte.  However, it also possible that the dismissal of Deloitte gives the client an opportunity to 
seek another auditor with better data security.  This could elicit a positive market reaction from 
shareholders.  This logic is also relevant when a client announces the appointment of Deloitte as 
auditor following the disclosure of the data breach.  
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
Table 8 presents the results of the OLS regression.  The dependent variable is the market 
reaction to the dates of announcements of the dismissal or appointment of Big 4 audit firms 
between 2004 and 2018.  We estimate the abnormal returns on the day of those announcements 
using the market adjusted return model with a value-weighted index (AbRet).  The independent 
variable Dismissals_Deloitte is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the departing auditor is 
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Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  Engagements_Deloitte is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the incoming 
auditor is Deloitte, 0 otherwise.  We interact both Dismissals_Deloitte, Engagements_Deloitte 
with Post, an indicator variable that equals 1 for auditor changes after the disclosure of the breach, 
0 otherwise.  The coefficient of Post X Dismissals_Deloitte is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level.  This finding suggests that investors react negatively to the dismissal of Deloitte in 
the post data breach period.  However, the Post X Engagements_Deloitte is not significant. 
[Insert Table 8 about here.] 
V. CONCLUSION 
We examine a security breach may negatively impact the reputation of an auditor.  
Specifically, we examine how audit clients and investors respond to a breach of confidential client 
data by Deloitte.  On the one hand, we find that Deloitte’s audit clients at the time of the breach 
did not experience a change in audit fees, nor were they more likely to dismiss Deloitte.  This 
finding indicates that Deloitte’s relationship with its current clients was able to mitigate any 
negative impact of the audit firm security breach.  On the other hand, Deloitte experienced a 
decrease in the number of new audit clients after the breach announcement as well as decreased 
first year audit fees for new clients.  Thus, the security breach did have a negative impact on 
Deloitte’s reputation in the new audit client market.  This is significant as the audit market is 
increasingly competitive with (increasing) downward pressure of audit fees. 
With respect to the stock market, we only find a negative market reaction when clients 
dismissed Deloitte as their independent auditor after the breach.  This result is consistent with the 
market not viewing the security breach as important and as a valid reason for changing auditors.  
The result is also consistent with recent security breach literature, showing that the consequences 
21 
 
for breached companies is very small (Richardson et al. 2018).  Future research can examine 
whether audit firms experience long-term consequences from a security breach. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Post 
 
1 for the period after the data breach is disclosed to the public, 0 otherwise; 
Deloitte 
 
1 for Deloitte audit client, 0 otherwise; 
Dismissals 
 
1 if the client changes independent auditor from year t to year t+1, 0 otherwise;  
Dismissals_Deloitte 
 
1 if the client switches from Deloitte from year t to year t+1, 0 otherwise;  
Engagements 
 
1 if the client changes independent auditor from year t-1 to year t, 0 otherwise;  
Engagements_Deloitte 
 
1 if the client switches to Deloitte from year t-1 to year t, 0 otherwise;  
Audfees 
 
Total fees paid to audit firm in year t; 
Assets 
 
Client’s total assets at the beginning of year t; 
Ret_Std 
 
The standard deviation of monthly stock returns in year t; 
Ocf_Std 
 
The standard deviation of cash flows from operations over the most recent 5-year 
period including year t; 
Revt_Std 
 
The standard deviation of sales revenues scaled by total assets over the most recent 
5-year period including year t; 
Zmijewski_Z 
 
Probability of bankruptcy in year t calculated using Zmijewski (1984’s) bankruptcy 
prediction model; 
Roa 
 
Income before tax scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
Leverage 
 
Total long-term debt scaled by total assets in year t; 
Btm 
 
Book value per share divided market price per share at the beginning of year t; 
Revgrowth 
 
Change in total sales revenue from year t-1 to year t; 
Ocf 
 
Cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at the beginning of year 
t; 
Ar_Invt 
 
The sum of total inventory and receivables divided by total assets at the beginning 
of year t; 
Icw 
 
1 if the company reported material weakness in internal controls over financial 
reporting in year t; 
Restate 
 
1 if the company reported an accounting restatement in year t; 
Gc 
 
1 if the company received a modified going concern opinion in year t; 
Replag 
 
the total number of days between the end of the fiscal year and audit report date; 
BusyYrEnd 
 
1 if the company's fiscal year ends in December or January, 0 otherwise; 
AbRet 
 
The abnormal market return on the date of announcement of event; 
Momentum   The trailing 180-day return on the firm's stock 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  N Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Std Dev 
Post 35,499 0.0552 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2283 
Deloitte 35,499 0.2363 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4248 
Dismissals 35,499 0.0414 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1993 
Dismissals_Deloitte 35,499 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0649 
Engagements 35,499 0.0288 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0948 
Engagements_Deloitte 35,499 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0897 
Audfees ($) 35,499 2,564,777.56 1,352,500.00 718,702.00 2,740,000.00 3,966,563.43 
Assets ($) 35,499 5,595,388,275 987,988,000 269,562,000 3,606,784,000 18,154,437,499 
Ret_Std 35,499 0.7010 0.3268 0.1772 0.5744 2.4423 
Ocf_Std 35,499 0.0973 0.0342 0.0170 0.0690 0.5533 
Revt_Std 35,499 0.1806 0.0934 0.0398 0.2012 0.3609 
Zmijewski_Z 35,499 -0.8800 -1.2739 -2.3528 -0.2727 5.6860 
Roa 35,499 -0.0457 0.0323 -0.0257 0.0720 0.5241 
Leverage 35,499 0.2254 0.1817 0.0060 0.3371 0.2430 
Btm 35,499 0.3900 0.3922 0.2134 0.6439 1.2161 
Revgrowth 35,499 0.1647 0.0701 -0.0155 0.1863 0.6825 
Ocf 35,499 0.0375 0.0855 0.0342 0.1406 0.3880 
Ar_Invt 35,499 0.2118 0.1766 0.0728 0.3107 0.1683 
Icw 35,499 0.0508 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2197 
Restate 35,499 0.0902 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2864 
Gc 35,499 0.0286 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1668 
Replag (days) 35,499 64.23 60.00 55.00 72.00 30.04 
BusyYrEnd 35,499 0.7804 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4140 
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Table 2: The Dismissal and Engagement of Deloitte Pre and Post Data Breach 
Variables   Dismissals  Engagements 
    
Intercept  1.8477 ***  -4.9677 *** 
  (7.07)   (30.57)  
Post  -2.9798 ***  -0.6439 *** 
  (17.67)   (5.93)  
Dismissals_Deloitte  0.3671     
  (0.04)     
Post X Dismissals_Deloitte  0.4954     
  (0.04)     
Engagements_Deloitte     -0.4898 * 
     (3.07)  
Post X Engagements_Deloitte     -1.0044 *** 
     (5.96)  
Ln (Assets)  -0.4234 ***  -0.1085 *** 
  (331.55)   (15.41)  
Ret_Std  0.0124   0.0106  
  (1.30)   (0.64)  
Ocf_Std  0.3924 **  -0.1606 ** 
  (4.33)   (6.00)  
Revt_Std  0.0562   0.0500  
  (0.33)   (0.48)  
Zmijewski_Z  -0.0001   0.0003  
  (0.01)   (0.02)  
Roa  0.0018   0.0136  
  (0.03)   (0.05)  
Leverage  0.2060   0.3747 * 
  (1.85)   (3.47)  
Btm  0.0796 ***  0.0879 * 
  (6.88)   (3.65)  
Revgrowth  -0.0593   0.1576 *** 
  (1.57)   (15.73)  
Ocf  0.1250   0.1623  
  (0.77)   (0.78)  
Ar_Invt  0.4420 **  0.0903  
  (5.52)   (0.13)  
Icw  0.9314 ***  -0.4677 *** 
  (80.10)   (10.72)  
Restate  0.2279 **  -0.7046 *** 
  (5.09)   (38.70)  
Gc  0.4247 ***  -0.0991  
  (8.27)   (0.15)  
30 
 
Ln (Replag)  0.7579 ***  0.7036 *** 
  (52.75)   (27.46)  
BusyYrEnd  -0.2482 ***  0.0320  
    (11.35)     (0.10)   
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
Pseudo R-Square  0.09   0.0613  
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Sq  2795.86 ***  1927.60 *** 
Obs.   35,499     35,499   
This table presents the results of the logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of dismissing and engaging Deloitte 
pre- and post the data breach. The dependent variables are in the first and second columns are Dismissals and 
Engagements. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Models are estimated with standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by client (Petersen 2009). Chi-sq. statistics are presented in parentheses 
below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on 
two-tailed tests). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Bold denotes variables of interest. 
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Table 3: Audit Fees Paid by Deloitte Clients Pre and Post Data Breach 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables   Ln (Audfees) 
  
Intercept  1.7719 ***  1.7761 ***  1.7786 *** 
  (3.54)   (3.57)   (3.53)  
Post  0.1541 ***  0.1533 ***  0.1558  
  (10.72)   (10.65)   (1.00)  
Deloitte  -0.0445 ***  -0.0449 ***  -0.0073  
  (6.14)   (6.12)   (0.15)  
Post X Deloitte  -0.0278   -0.0305   -0.1995 *** 
  (0.96)   (1.03)   (4.01)  
Ln (Assets)  0.5497 ***  0.5503 ***  0.5062 *** 
  (272.43)   (269.91)   (31.53)  
Ret_Std  0.0066 ***  0.0065 ***  0.0138  
  (5.51)   (5.31)   (1.39)  
Ocf_Std  0.0196 **  0.0679 ***  0.0085  
  (2.46)   (5.36)   (0.66)  
Revt_Std  0.0850 ***  0.1039 ***  0.0310  
  (9.30)   (10.40)   (0.77)  
Zmijewski_Z  0.0089 ***  0.0102 ***  0.0020  
  (5.88)   (6.45)   (0.17)  
Roa  -0.0479 ***  -0.0441 ***  -0.0472  
  (3.17)   (2.90)   (0.30)  
Leverage  0.0368 **  0.0262   0.1754  
  (2.32)   (1.62)   (1.49)  
Btm  -0.0089 ***  -0.0071 ***  -0.0845 *** 
  (3.47)   (2.76)   (3.72)  
Revgrowth  -0.0227 ***  -0.0222 ***  -0.0190  
  (5.05)   (4.82)   (0.81)  
Ocf  -0.2754 ***  -0.2908 ***  -0.2494 *** 
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  (16.92)   (17.10)   (3.26)  
Ar_Invt  0.6821 ***  0.6750 ***  0.6994 *** 
  (29.29)   (28.62)   (4.28)  
Icw  0.3295 ***  0.3174 ***  0.5094 *** 
  (25.00)   (23.44)   (7.98)  
Restate  0.0821 ***  0.0760 ***  0.1874 *** 
  (7.98)   (7.23)   (3.42)  
Gc  0.1526 ***  0.1588 ***  -0.1329  
  (7.31)   (7.46)   (1.12)  
Ln (Replag)  0.4170 ***  0.4155 ***  0.4100 *** 
  (32.37)   (31.51)   (6.22)  
BusyYrEnd  0.0935 ***  0.0925 ***  0.1285 ** 
    (13.18)     (12.93)     (2.53)   
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-Square  0.78   0.78   0.72  
F Value  2795.86 ***  1190.13 ***  23.41 *** 
Obs.   35,499     34,477     1,022   
This table presents the results of the OLS regression to estimate the audit fees paid by Deloitte clients pre- and post the data breach. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of total audit fees. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Models are estimated with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by client (Petersen 2009). T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Bold denotes variables of interest. 
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Table 4: Audit Fees Paid by Deloitte Clients Pre and Post Data Breach (Changes OLS Regression) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables   Chg_Audfees 
  
Intercept  -1.4597 *  -1.3419 **  -1.3853 * 
  (1.68)   (2.24)   (1.74)  
Post  0.0860 ***  0.0879 ***  0.3887  
  (3.34)   (4.92)   (0.68)  
Deloitte  -0.0158   -0.0013   -0.0265  
  (1.22)   (0.14)   (0.15)  
Post X Deloitte  0.0177   -0.0029   -0.5091 ** 
  (0.34)   (0.08)   (2.17)  
Chg_Ln_Assets  -0.3820 ***  -0.3815 ***  -0.3117 * 
  (21.28)   (29.71)   (1.78)  
Chg_Ret_Std  -0.0002   0.0001 *  0.0008  
  (1.34)   (1.72)   (0.66)  
Chg_Ocf_Std  0.0625 ***  -0.0013   5.9548 *** 
  (7.06)   (0.21)   (11.38)  
Chg_Revt_Std  0.0514 ***  -0.0013   0.7907 *** 
  (10.04)   (0.38)   (3.75)  
Chg_Zmijewski_Z  0.0143 ***  0.0047 ***  0.1711 *** 
  (6.23)   (2.92)   (4.33)  
Chg_Roa  -0.1871 ***  -0.0863 ***  2.5012 *** 
  (7.35)   (4.87)   (4.32)  
Chg_Leverage  0.3917 **  -0.1214 ***  4.0993 *** 
  (9.76)   (4.30)   (6.97)  
Chg_Btm  -0.0001 ***  -0.0005 ***  -0.1963 *** 
  (3.04)   (3.17)   (7.47)  
Chg_Revgrowth  -0.0002   -0.0001   -0.2024 *** 
  (0.65)   (0.49)   (3.88)  
Chg_Ocf  -0.0613 **  -0.0086   0.6048  
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  (2.03)   (0.41)   (1.12)  
Chg_Ar_Invt  0.0963   0.3207 ***  4.2422 *** 
  (0.89)   (4.20)   (3.04)  
Chg_Icw  0.7009 ***  0.6854 ***  1.1287 *** 
  (24.11)   (33.23)   (3.67)  
Chg_Restate  0.2062 ***  0.1979 ***  0.2132 *** 
  (8.07)   (10.95)   (0.75)  
Chg_Gc  0.0369   -0.0195   -0.4203  
  (1.01)   (0.76)   (0.94)  
Chg_Ln_Replag  -0.8749 ***  -0.8718 ***  -1.0977 *** 
    (43.36)     (60.93)     (5.15)   
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-Square  0.13   0.21   0.76  
F Value  48.18 ***  83.33 ***  28.07 *** 
Obs.   35,499     34,477     1,022   
This table presents the results of the OLS regression to estimate changes in audit fees paid by Deloitte clients pre- and post the data breach. The dependent variable 
is the change in total audit fees from year t-1 to year t. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Models are estimated with standard errors that are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustered by client (Petersen 2009). T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Bold denotes variables of interest. 
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Table 5: Market Reaction to the Disclosure of the Data Breach – Summary Statistics 
  N Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Std Dev 
AbRet 1828 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0107 0.0498 0.0655 
Deloitte 1828 0.2287 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4201 
Mkvl 1828 12026.65 2055.98 634.20 7155.92 43679.75 
Btm 1828 0.1991 0.3097 0.1554 0.5417 7.4650 
Momentum 1828 0.0428 0.0266 -0.1134 0.3889 3.5892 
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Table 6: Market Reaction to the Disclosure of the Data Breach  
Variables   AbRet (0, 0) 
  
Intercept  -0.00002  
  (0.01)  
Deloitte  -0.00022  
  (0.18)  
Ln (Mkvl)  -0.81000  
  (1.22)  
Btm  -0.00001 *** 
  (4.80)  
Momentum  0.00003 * 
    (1.78)   
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  
Adjusted R-Square  0.001  
F Value  341.64 *** 
Obs.   1,828   
This table presents the results of the OLS regression to examine market reaction to the announcement of the breach. 
The dependent variable is the abnormal return on the day of the disclosure of the breach calculated using market 
adjusted returns with a value-weighted index. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Models are estimated 
with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by client (Petersen 2009). T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively (based on two-tailed tests). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Bold denotes variables of interest. 
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Table 7: Market Reaction to the Dismissal and Engagement of Deloitte Pre and Post Data Breach – Summary Statistics 
  N Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Std Dev 
AbRet (0, 0) 3471 0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0154 0.0141 0.0461 
Post 3471 0.0531 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2243 
Dismissals_Deloitte 3471 0.1181 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3227 
Engagements_Deloitte 3471 0.1175 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3220 
Mkvl 3471 2160.86 200.13 46.94 805.34 9998.58 
Btm 3471 0.6783 0.5088 0.2669 0.8510 1.1015 
Momentum 3471 0.0319 0.0262 -0.3145 0.3305 2.8943 
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Table 8: Market Reaction to the Dismissal and Engagement of Deloitte Pre and Post Data Breach  
  (1)  (2) 
Variables   AbRet (0, 0) 
  
Intercept  0.00400 **  0.00414 ** 
  (2.30)   (2.34)  
Post  0.00573 *  0.04609 ** 
  (1.81)   (2.37)  
Dismissals_Deloitte  -0.00016     
  (0.08)     
Post X Dismissals_Deloitte  -0.01657 ***    
  (2.67)     
Engagements_Deloitte     0.00135  
     (0.59)  
Post X Engagements_Deloitte     -0.00044  
     (0.07)  
Ln (Mkvl)  -0.00047   -0.00053  
  (1.06)   (1.15)  
Btm  -0.00060   -0.00063  
  (0.61)   (0.64)  
Momentum  0.00003 *  0.00048 * 
    (1.93)     (1.92)   
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-Square  0.003   0.003  
F Value  2.29 ***  2.29 *** 
Obs.   3,471     3,471   
This table presents the results of the OLS regression to examine market reaction to the announcement of 8-K disclosure 
of the dismissal and engagement of Deloitte. The dependent variable is the abnormal return on the day of the 8-K 
disclosure using market adjusted returns with a value-weighted index. All specifications include industry fixed effects. 
Models are estimated with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by client (Petersen 2009). 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Bold denotes 
variables of interest. 
 
 
